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Recent Developments

Jaffee v. Redmond

I

n an opinion that gave an
extensive review of the evolutionary development of federal
privilege law, the United States
Supreme Court resolved a conflict
among the circuits by recognizing
an absolute psychotherapist-patient
privilege. In Jaffee v. Redmond,
116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), the Court
held that Federal Rule of Evidence
501 authorizes federal courts to
extend a privilege to confidential
communications between licensed
psychotherapists and their patients
made during the course of diagnosis or treatment. In so holding, the
Court left open to case-by-case
interpretation the delineation of the
privilege's scope.
On June 17, 1991, respondent
Mary Lu Redmond, ("Redmond"),
a police officer for the Village of
Hoffman Estates, Illinois, responded to a "fight in progress"
call at an apartment complex.
Redmond was the first officer to
arrive at the scene, where onlookers informed her that a stabbing
had occurred. While awaiting the
arrival of an ambulance and support officers, Redmond observed
Ricky Allen, Jr. emerging from the
apartment complex chasing another man. Believing that Allen
was about to stab the man,
Redmond ordered Allen to drop
the weapon. When he continued to
ignore her, Redmond fired her
service revolver, fatally wounding
Allen, who died at the scene.
Carrie Jaffee ("Jaffee"), the
administrator of Allen's estate,
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filed suit against b.oth Redmond
and the Village of Hoffman Estates
in U.S. District Court. She sought
damages for the death of her son
under federal and state statutes,
claiming that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights
by use of excessive force. Upon
learning that Redmond had received therapy after the shooting,
Jaffee attempted to discover
records of conversations between
Redmond and clinical social
worker Karen Beyer. Despite
Redmond's assertion that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege
protected the communications, the
district court judge ordered disclosure of the records. When both
Redmond and Beyer refused to
comply with the order, the trial
judge instructed the jury that they
could presume Redmond's failure
to submit the documents was based
on her desire to keep out injurious
information. As a result, the jury
awarded Jaffee damages under
both the federal and state law
claims.
The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court, holding
that recognition of a qualified
psychotherapist-patient privilege

was required under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501. Declaring that the
privilege would apply only if a
patient's privacy interest outweighed the court's need for evidence, the court applied the balancing test to the case at bar, and
found that Redmond's interest in
protecting the confidential records
outweighed the evidentiary need.
The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and affirmed the
court of appeals' recognition of the
privilege. The Court, however,
rejected the lower court's case-bycase balancing approach to its
application.
In an opinion by Justice Stevens,
the Court began by acknowledging
that Congress, in enacting Federal
Rule of Evidence 501, intended for
federal courts to delineate new
privileges according to the principles established by the common
law, and "'in the light of reason
and experience.'" Jaffee, 116 S.
Ct. at 1927 (quoting Wolfe v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12
(1934)). At common law, testimonial privileges were disfavored
because of the principle that "'the
public has a right to every man's
evidence. '" Id. at 1928 (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, p. 64
(3d ed. 1940))). This rule would
allow no exceptions unless warranted by a transcendent public
good. Id. (citing Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980) (quoting Elkins v. United
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 37
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States, 364 U.S. 206,234 (1960))).
Emphasizing that reason and experience necessitated recognition of
the privilege, the Court reasoned
that the shielding of confidential
psychotherapist-patient communications from discovery furthered
interests important enough to outweigh a court's need for probative
evidence. Id (citing Trammel, 445
U.S. at 51 (1980)).
The Court analogized the
psychotherapist-patient relationship to that of attorney and client
and that of spouses, stating that an
atmosrhp.re of trust that fosters
complete disclosure is essential to
all of these relationships. Id at
1928. Thus, the Court reasoned,
the privilege furthers the important
private interest of encouraging
frank communications between
psychotherapist and patient. Id at
1929.
Furthermore, because the common law makes clear that a privilege must also serve a public good,
the Court examined the societal
benefit
promoted
by
the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Id (citing Upjohn v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981)). Determining that a public good is promoted
when citizens are encouraged to
seek treatment for mental or emotional problems, the Court concluded that the privilege complies
with the common-law mandate.
Id at 1929.
The Court next reasoned that it
is appropriate for federal courts to
recognize a psychotherapistpatient privilege because some
form of the privilege has been
enacted into law in all fifty states.
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 38

Id The Court noted that the
States' protection against compelled disclosure would be
meaningless if not credited by
federal courts.
Id at 1930.
Rejecting Jaffee's argument that
the Court should disregard States'
adoption of the privilege because
legislatively promulgated, and
therefore politically influenced, the
Court acknowledged that such
policy determinations by state
legislatures reflect both reason and
experience. Id (citing Funk v.
United States, 190 U.S. 371, 37681 (1933)).
To further bulwark the Court's
recognition of the privilege, Justice
Stevens referred to the Advisory
Committee's inclusion of a
psychotherapist-patient privilege
in its original draft of Rule 501.
The proposed rule included nine
express privileges, but was rejected in favor of the more flexible
rule that Congress eventually
adopted. Id at 1930.
Noting the significant amount
of mental health treatment provided by licensed social workers,
the Court made clear that the privilege extends not only to psychiatrists and psychologists, but
equally
to
confidential
communications made between
licensed social workers and their
patients in the course of diagnosis
or treatment. Id at 1931.
Significantly, the Court refused
to condition the privilege upon a
balancing of the court's evidentiary need and the patient's privacy
need, explaining that this would
result in uncertainty of application,
thus destroying the privilege's

benefit. Id at 1932 (citing Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393).
In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Scalia declared the scope of the
new privilege to be ill-defined. He
criticized the majority's premise
that the private and public interests
served by the privilege are important enough to override the court's
need for evidence and questioned
the majority's conclusion that recognition of the privilege will result
in more open communications. Id
at 1934. Justice Scalia protested
the Court's reliance upon state
privilege law, contending that legislatively enacted testimonial exceptions should not provide guidance for judicial interpretation of
the common law. Id at 1935-36.
Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that
the inclusion of licensed social
workers within the definition of
"psychotherapist" is a matter best
left to Congress, not to the Court.
Id at 1940.
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a
psychotherapist -patient privilege
for the first time. Although Maryland's General Assembly had already
provided
for
a
psychotherapist-patient privilege
in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article section 9-109 of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, the
decision affords patients who seek
counseling in Maryland the additional certainty that the privilege
will be honored in federal courts.

